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THIRD CIRCUIT'S REJECTION OF CAVEAT
EMPTOR IN CERCLA CONTRIBUTION
CLAIMS IMPOSES DOUBLE LIABILITY ON
REMOTE VENDORS: SMITH LAND &
IMPROVEMENT CORP. V. CELOTEX,
851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.1988)
In 1980 Congress responded to the costly' problem of cleaning up
abandoned toxic waste dumps by passing the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2
Courts have interpreted CERCLA's liability provisions broadly, per-
mitting state and federal authorities to impose strict3 and joint and sev-
1. Cleanup costs average $6.5 million per site where groundwater problems do not
exist and $10 million per site where the EPA has found groundwater contamination.
Estimates for the total cleanup bill of all targeted sites that eventually may require
cleanup have ranged from $8 billion to $100 billion. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEss-
MENT, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPERFUND STRATEGY 3 (1985). See also Hazardous
Waste Sites May Cost $22 Billion to Clean Up, EPA Study Says, 9 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2085 (Mar. 9, 1979); $8.4 Billion to $16 Billion More Needed to Clean Superfund Sites,
EPA Paper Says, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1725 (Feb. 3, 1984).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986)). The Act is popularly known as "Superfund."
3. Courts have interpreted the statute to impose strict liability. See United States v.
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (D.N.J. 1983) (imposing strict liability on a past, non-
negligent, off-site generator for hazardous waste); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also United States v. Stringfellow, 14 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,385, 20,387 (C.D. Cal. April 5, 1984) (only § 107(a), and
not § 106(a), permits joint and several liability); United States v. South Carolina Re-
cycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272, 20,274 (D.S.C. Feb.
23, 1984) (CERCLA § 107(a) holds defendants strictly liable); United States v. Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (citing United States v. Price,
577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983), for proposition that "past off-site generators should be
held to a standard of strict liability"); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (standard of strict liability ap-
plies equally to § 106(a) of CERCLA); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F.
Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (strict liability is intended standard under CER-
CLA; Congress did not preclude imposition of joint and several liability).
In addition, Congress designed CERCLA liability to be strict by reference to section
311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), codified at 33 U.S.C.
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eral4 liability5 on responsible 6 "persons"7 for cleanup costs, regardless
§ 1321(c) (1982), a provision for recovery of cleanup costs for spills into navigable wa-
ters. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The drafters of CERCLA intention-
ally referred to section 311 to trigger a strict liability standard. See 126 CONG. REC.
30,932 (1980) statement by Senator Randolph,
We have kept strict liability in the compromise, specifying the standard of liability
under § 311 of the Clean Water Act (FWPCA) .... Iunderstand this to be a stan-
dard of strict liability .... As under § 311, due care or the absence of negligence
with respect to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance does not
constitute a defense under this act.
Id. See also 126 CONG. REC. 31,966 (1980) (letter from Assistant Attorney General
Alan A. Parker to Rep. Florio and remarks of Rep. Florio). See generally Giblin &
Kelly, Judicial Development of Standards of Liability in Government Enforcement Ac-
tion Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1984-85).
4. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), is the
seminal case which district courts have followed in imposing joint and several liability.
See also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)
("although Congress deleted the explicit reference to joint and several liability from the
final enactment, [we find] that joint and several liability is at least permissible, if not
mandated, under the facts of this case."); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (courts should impose joint and several liability upon responsible
defendants, unless defendants establish that a reasonable basis exists for apportioning
harm among them); United States v. Cauffrnan, 21 Env't Rep Cas. (BNA) 2167 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (finding of joint and several liability does not depend on proof of causation);
see also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (D. Minn.
1982) (EPA and state of Minnesota joined successor landowners to insure that the re-
medial measures requested could be fully implemented.).
5. For a discussion of Congress' deliberations on CERCLA's liability provisions, see
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("Superfund") of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
Generally, courts impose joint and several liability when two or more persons inde-
pendently cause a distinct or single harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433A (1977). On the liability of joint tortfeasors generally, see W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 46-52 (5th ed. 1984).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) specifically imposes liability for
cleanup costs on the owner or operator of a site, the prior owner or operator at the time
of the hazardous waste disposal, those who arranged for waste disposal or treatment at
the site, and any transporter of the hazardous waste. Courts interpret the statute to
implicitly impose liability on a number of other parties, including owners of property on
which illegal dumping has occurred (City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982)); innocent purchasers of contaminated property (New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985)); lessors and lessees (United
States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI), 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272 (D.S.C. 1984)); secured creditors (United States v. Maryland
Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)); successor or merged corporations
(Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforce-
ment and Compliance Monitoring, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor
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of fault.' The Act's few defenses9 make it very difficult for blameless
parties to escape liability. The harshness of this result has engendered
considerable judicial and congressional concern1° over who should
bear the ultimate cost of cleanup.'1 In Smith Land & Improvement
Corp. v. Celotex, 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit refused to allow successor corporations 3 to invoke the corn-
Corporations for Abandoned Sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act 12 (June 13, 1984))[hereinafter EPA Memorandum];
and corporate officials (United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986)).
7. The Act defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, part-
nership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2nd Cir. 1985)
("[§ 9607(a)(1)] unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility
from which there is a release or threat of release, without regard to causation.").
9. CERCLA section 107(b) lists available defenses as an act of God, an act of war,
or an act or omission of a third party. To utilize the third party defense, the defendant
must show he exercised due care and took precautions against all foreseeable third party
acts and omissions. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
10. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA
amendments.
11. See supra note 6 for a list of liable parties. See also Belthoff, Private Cost Recov-
ery Actions Under Section 107 of CERCLA, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 192 (1986)
("Although the private cost recovery action has several problems and is still in a stage
of development, the action" provides an effective means to protect the environment from
abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites.").
12. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988). This action arises out of two separate lawsuits.
Smith Land filed lawsuits against each individual corporate successor, alleging similar
causes of action. Plaintiffs in the original case, Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v.
Celotex, No. 87-5741, filed suit on October 21, 1987. Smith Land & Improvement
Corp. v. Rapid American, No. 86-1151 originated on September 22, 1987. The cases
were consolidated on appeal in 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988).
13. The balance of the Smith Land decision discusses corporate successor liability
and holds that corporate successors are liable for the environmental torts of their prede-
cessors in CERCLA contribution claims. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celo-
tex, 851 F.2d at 90-92 (3rd Cir. 1988). The court reached this conclusion by relying on
a 1984 EPA Memorandum. See EPA Memorandum, supra note 6. The EPA's policy
expands liability under CERCLA to include successor corporations who would be po-
tentially liable parties under CERCLA. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.§ 9607(a)(2), provides
that past owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities are potentially liable parties
under CERCLA. Under the EPA's policy, liability exists regardless of whether the
successor continues the same hazardous waste activities as the predecessor. EPA Mem-
orandum at 5 (the EPA only requires a "continuation of business operations" between
the predecessor and successor). The EPA contends that "public policy considerations"
Washington University Open Scholarship
276 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 37:273
mon law defense of caveat emptor 14 to escape liability for cleanup
costs. 15
In 1984 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)16 notified
Smith Land17 that its property contained a hazardous waste site requir-
ing immediate cleanup. Smith Land performed the work itself,' 8 but
and the "legislative history" of CERCLA justify the expansion of liability to include
successor corporations. Id. Supporters of the policy argue that it internalizes costs
within the particular type of manufacturing enterprise rather than the industry as a
whole. See Comment, Successor Corporate Liability for Improper Disposal of Hazardous
Waste, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 909, 921 (1985). Critics, however, argue that because
corporate successors have not created the risk of environmental torts under CERCLA,
they do not benefit from the predecessor's waste disposal practices, nor are they in a
position to lessen the associated danger of environmental damages. See, Cyphert and
Key, Hazardous Waste Facility Successor Liability the Ultimate in Guilt by Association,
27 FOR THE DEF. 18 (Nov. 1985).
14. The common law doctrine of caveat emptor remains applicable to realty sales in
every common law jurisdiction. See M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES
OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.2(n), at 37 (4th ed. 1984) ("In the ordinary sale of realty this
doctrine [caveat emptor] not only applies, it flourishes"). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 352, comment (a) (1965) summarizes the prevailing view of vendor liability:
Under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the original rule was that, in the ab-
sence of express agreement, the vendor of land was not liable to vendee, or afortiori
to any other person, for the condition of the land existing at the time of transfer.
As to sales of land this rule has retained much of its original force, and the implied
warranties which have grown up around the sale of chattels have never developed.
This is perhaps because great importance always has been attached to the deed of
conveyance, which is taken to represent the full agreement of the parties, and to
exclude all other terms and liabilities. The vendee is required to make his own
inspection of the premises, and the vendor is not responsible to him for their defec-
tive condition, existing at the time of transfer.
Id
15. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 90 (3rd Cir. 1988).
16. The Environmental Protection Agency is the agency responsible for implement-
ing CERCLA. Since Congress enacted CERCLA, the EPA has compiled an inventory
of hazardous waste disposal sites that require some type of cleanup. See CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, IST SESS., HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT: RECENT
CHANGES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES 17 (1985).
17. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 87. Smith Land was not the original vendee. The
district court noted that Smith's predecessor was a "sophisticated" company that had
inspected the land on five occasions, knew of its past use, and admitted that the pile of
waste was a "negative" factor in the decision to purchase the property. Id. at 88.
18. Under threat of enforcement action by the EPA, Smith Land entered into a
consent agreement whereby the EPA required Smith Land to conduct a remedial pro-
gram. Smith Land covered all exposed asbestos with soil, graded all slopes to decrease
erosion, covered all slopes with vegetation, erected fences and warning signs around the
perimeter of the facility and established a permanent monitoring program. Plaintiff
incurred costs of $218,945.44 in connection with its cleanup efforts. Brief for appellant
at 6, Smith Land Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5740).
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sought indemnification' 9 from the successor corporations currently
holding title to the property20 before settling with the EPA. When the
remote vendors refused to indemnify Smith Land, the vendee filed
suit21 under Section 10722 of CERCLA. The District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania23 held that caveat emptor precluded
Smith Land from recouping cleanup costs.24 The court noted that
Smith Land, through its predecessor, inspected 25 the property on more
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) provides that "[a]ny person may seek contribution from
any other person who is liable .... under Section 9607(a)." Such claims "shall be gov-
erned by Federal law." Id. In resolving contribution claims, "the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate." Id. In addition, a person "who has resolved its liability to the United
States for some or all of a response action in an administrative or judicially approved
settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement." 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(A).
20. The Celotex Corporation ("Celotex") and Rapid-American are successor corpo-
rations to the Philip Carey Manufacturing Company ("Philip Carey"). Rapid-American
is the actual successor corporation to Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, while Cel-
otex is the successor-in-interest to Mr. Philip Carey. Philip Carey operated a manufac-
turing company in Pennsylvania from 1906 to 1961. Its manufacturing process
produced asbestos waste which the company disposed of on the land now owned by
Smith Land. Brief for Appellant at 3-7, Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Rapid-
American Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988)(No. 87-5740). Asbestos is a "hazardous
substance" as defined in Section 101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
In 1963, Smith Land's predecessor, Exeter Investment Corp., a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of Smith Land, purchased the land owned by Philip Carey upon which Philip Ca-
rey had disposed of the hazardous waste. Subsequent to the conveyance, Exeter
Investment Corporation merged with Smith Land. Smith Land notified both Celotex
and Rapid-American of its intention to seek indemnification. Brief for Appellant at 3-7,
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Rapid American Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988)(No. 87-5740).
21. Smith Land brought the actions under CERCLA and included several pendent
law claims under Pennsylvania state environmental statutes. Smith Land also made
claims under common law theories of restitution, unjust enrichment and indemnity.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 87-
5740).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) provides that responsible parties are liable for clean-
up costs incurred by "any person" in remedying releases of hazardous substances. Id.
See supra note 6 for a listing of liable parties.
23. The district court's opinion is unpublished.
24. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 88; see also, Kain v. Weitzel, 72 Ohio App. 229, 50
N.E. 2d 605, 607 (1943) ("Under the rule of caveat emptor, a purchaser takes all the
risks being bound to judge and examine for himself as to title of land purchased unless
he is dissuaded from doing so by representations of some kind.").
25. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 88. Exeter Investment, Smith Land's predecessor, in-
spected the land on more than five occasions. The district court also noted that Exeter
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than five occasions and presumably paid a price which reflected poten-
tial future liability.26 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed,27 finding that neither the legislative history nor the
language of the Act supported the district court's holding. Allowing
defendants to plead caveat emptor, the court held, would frustrate Con-
gress' aim to encourage cleanup by responsible parties.28 Moreover,
the defense would completely bar recovery by a purchaser regardless of
other equities affecting the parties.29
Despite the court's rejection of caveat emptor in CERCLA contribu-
tion actions, the common law has long recognized the doctrine as a
defense to liability for the condition of land at the time of transfer ab-
sent express agreement between the parties.3° Caveat emptor requires
the vendee to make his own inspection before purchase, with the deed
of conveyance representing the full agreement of the parties.31 Because
the vendor and vendee deal at arms length with equal access to infor-
mation, the common law entitles buyers to only those protections for
which they specifically contract.32
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to establish a system of liability
knew of the site's past use and admitted that the pile of waste was a "negative" factor in
Exeter's decision to purchase the land. Id.
26. 851 F.2d at 88. The district court relied on Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985), in which the Third
Circuit upheld the defense of caveat emptor under an identical set of facts. The only
difference, however, between the two cases is that Philadelphia Elea was a state law
claim under the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, 35 PA. CONS. STAT., § 691 (1987 &
Supp. 1988) rather than CERCLA.
27. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 89-90.
28. Id. at 89. The court concluded that caveat emptor does not keep with the poli-
cies underlying CERCLA. Iad
29. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 90. The court held that caveat emptor may only be
considered in mitigation of amount due to Smith Land. Id.
30. See, e.g., Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983) (purchasers of unim-
proved property reasonably expected to make knowledgeable inspection before purchase
and were more likely to have bargained for express warranty). For an excellent history
of the doctrine of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim of Caveat Emptor,
40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
31. See supra note 14.
32. See, eg., Wolf v. Christman, 202 Pa. 475, 51 A. 1101 (1902) ("Rule of caveat
emptor does not obtain where one buys on a warranty or express representation"); Pi-
nole v. Rooers, 193 Pa. 94, 44 A. 275 (1899) ("Where grantee accepts .... deed, and
pays the purchase money, caveat emptor will apply, when, in ejectment, he sets up a
deficiency in quality as warranting him in holding more land than was conveyed to
him."). But see Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 124, 288 A.2d 771, 774-75 (1972)
(courts will apply implied warranty theory where transaction involves sale of new home,
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that would ensure that those parties responsible for generating the haz-
ardous waste problems would pay the cleanup costs.3 3 The Act estab-
lished a $1.6 billion "Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund"34 to
give the federal government the resources to finance immediate clean-
ups. Furthermore, the Act authorizes fund representatives to sue re-
sponsible35 private parties for response costs. 3 6  Courts interpreting
the Act have upheld CERCLA defendants' right to implead other re-
because builder-vendors enjoy superior bargaining power and are better able to assume
liability because of their expertise).
33. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 903 (D.N.H. 1985)
("[G]overnment is free to undertake thorough and cautious action in potentially pro-
tracted hazardous waste clean-up operations"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem.
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("[CERCLA] should not be narrowly
interpreted to frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly and effectively, or
to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs.").
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) provides:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat
of such release into the environment or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of
release in the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may produce an
imminent or substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is
authorized to act.. .to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for reme-
dial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant any
time....
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b) provides that Congress will finance the fund by taxes levied
over a five-year period on the oil and chemical industry and by a smaller contribution
from the general revenues. Id.
35. See supra note 6 for a listing of liable parties.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Generally, response costs are those
costs that the government incurs in cleaning up or controlling the release of a hazardous
substance. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1473 (D. Colo.
1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., (NEPACCO), 579
F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Wade 1). Few courts have
actually addressed the definition or dimension of response cost. Congress did not spe-
cifically define response costs, however it did define "response" as "removal, remedy
and remedial action." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). Response costs must be necessary and
consistent with the National Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
The court in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co. held that
response costs include: the United States Government's litigation costs and attorney
fees; salaries and expenses associated with the United States Government's monitoring,
assessing, and evaluating the release of contaminants; expenses associated with the gov-
ernment's actions taken to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damages that might result
from the release or threat of contaminants from a hazardous waste disposal site; pre-
judgment interest at the rate of nine percent per year calculated from the date the com-
plaint was filed under CERCLA; and all future costs of removal or remedial actions
that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan and incurred by the United
States government in cleaning up a hazardous waste site. Id. at 850, 852.
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sponsible parties in order to recoup response costs. 37 Largely because
the Act was the product of hurried Congressional compromise, 38 Con-
gress left the precise liability standards, 39 the definition of responsible
party4' and the scope of the defenses41 for judicial resolution.42
Working under this imprecise legislative guidance, courts developed
37. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,804,
20,805 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (right to contribution not necessarily found to be implicit in the
statute, but within the court's power to create federal common law); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp 823, 850 (W.D. Mo.
1984), aff'd in relevant part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[the fact that there is not a
claim before this Court seeking recovery on behalf of the fund does not bar recovery by
the plaintiff"). See Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs Under CER-
CLA, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 345, 346 (1985) ("The Act's legislative history and the
federal government's implementation of CERCLA indicate that a right to contribution
arises for response costs whenever joint and several liability exits under CERCLA.").
38. The hurried compromise resulted in vagueness and confusion in the statute.
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982).
See generally Gulino, A Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal
Common Law, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 668, 693 ("The presence of an incomplete statu-
tory scheme and a strong federal interest in abating hazardous waste spills buttress the
argument for gap filling by federal courts.").
39. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing
various senators' statements explaining the deletion of joint and several liability in favor
of an equitable case-by-case approach); see also 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (com-
ments of Sen. Randolph):
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this Act, if any, shall be gov-
erned by traditional and evolving principles of common law. An example is joint
and several liability. Any reference to these terms has been deleted, and the liabil-
ity of joint tort feasors will be determined under common law or previous statu-
tory law.
Id. For an overview of senators' pertinent commentary, see generally, Note Gulino, A
Right of Contribution under CERCLA: The Case for Federal Common Law, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. 668 (1986).
40. For a statutory overview see Note, CERCLA Defendants: The Problem of Ex-
panding Liability and Diminishing Defenses, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 289,
300-11 (1987).
41. See supra note 6 for a listing of liable parties.
42. See supra note 9 for a list of CERCLA defenses. In the instant case, the court
noted that the defenses enumerated in section 9607(b) are not exclusive to contribution
suits.
Other CERCLA provisions suggest additional defenses. For example, the Act limits
to three years the period in which an action may be brought. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1982
& Supp. V 1987). A party which has resolved its liability to the government is not liable
to other parties for contribution, and the settlement may reduce the claim pro tanto.
See id. § 9613(f)(2). In addition, agreements to indemnify or hold harmless are en-
forceable between the parties but not against the government. See id. § 9607(e). More-
over, the defenses in section 9607(b) coexist with equitable considerations that may
mitigate damages. See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 90.
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varied interpretations of CERCLA liability for contribution costs in
the vendor-vendee context. In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical
Co. 43 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania first encountered the problem of whether a vendee who inher-
ited, but did not cause or contribute to, a hazardous waste problem
must ultimately pay cleanup costs. Despite the vendee's own strict lia-
bility as owner,' the district court held that CERCLA permits a ven-
dee to independently clean the site and recover cleanup costs from a
prior owner.45 The court addressed the liability of such an "innocent
party" in dicta and reasoned that courts should impose liability only on
those parties who participate in substantial and purposeful waste dispo-
sal activity or who reap some commercial benefit from their conduct.
4 6
Following the reasoning of Stepan Chemical, courts have recognized
that CERCLA's defenses47 are themselves equitable and nonexclu-
sive.48 In Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Corp.," for example, the
43. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) states that "the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility
... shall be liable [for clean up costs]."
45. City of Philadelphia, 544 F. Supp. at 1142. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) provides
for a system of liability so that those responsible for the particular hazardous waste
problem will pay for the cleanup. See Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589
F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984) ("[CERCLA] is designed . . . to facilitate the
prompt cleanup of hazardous dump sites by providing a means of financing both gov-
ernmental and private response costs and by placing the ultimate financial burden on
those responsible for the danger."); see also Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,103, 20,105 (E.D. Tenn. August 16,
1984) (the dispositive consideration in Stepan was that the plaintiff City did not operate
a hazardous waste disposal facility on the premises and did not voluntarily permit the
placement of the hazardous substances on its property); D'Imperio v. United States, 575
F. Supp. 248, 253 (D.N.J. 1983) ("[in] order to seek recovery [under § 107(a)(4)(B)], it
is necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he himself is not liable for these costs.").
In order for a private party to claim against the Fund, a release of a reportable quan-
tity of hazardous substance must occur. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a). Subsequently, the party
must make a demand for recovery of costs incurred in cleaning up the spill, and must
wait 60 days for satisfaction of the demand. Id.
46. City of Philadelphia, 544 F. Supp. at 1143 n.10.
47. See supra note 9 for a list of CERCLA defenses.
48. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (D. Ariz. 1984)
("defenses listed in subsection of liability provision of CERCLA are not exclusive"); see
also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 847 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'din relevant part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)(ac-
tions based on Section 107 are actually equitable actions in the nature of restitution).
49. 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1057 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
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court held that the equitable defense of "unclean hands"5 is applicable
in a CERCLA private response cost recovery action." Additionally,
the Mardan court held that the vendor's settlement agreement and re-
lease barred all subsequent claims, a result which the parties may have
reasonably intended to preclude at the time of negotiation.52 In
Mardan the plaintiff actively participated in the creation of hazardous
waste after purchasing the property. The court reasoned that those
who knowingly purchase a contaminated site and who participate in
further contamination are equitably estopped from recovering cleanup
costs from prior owners.53 Such a conclusion, the court reasoned, does
not contravene the intent or purpose of the Act because the prior own-
ers would remain liable to the state or federal government despite those
defenses.
54
Courts have also recognized a defense to current owners' strict liabil-
ity for those purchasers who knowingly inherit a hazardous waste
problem, but who subsequently and independently commence cleanup
operations. In Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.5 the
court permitted an innocent purchaser who did not cause or contribute
to the waste problem to recover cleanup costs from the vendor. The
court held that even though a private party, and not the government,
initiated cleanup efforts, courts have not hesitated to grant relief.56
CERCLA has also subjected secured creditors to liability for
cleanup costs.5 7 CERCLA imposes liability on any secured creditor
50. The unclean hands defense suggests that one party can only sue a potentially
responsible party under CERCLA section 107(a) when the first party did not partici-
pate in the creation of the hazardous waste site.
51. Mardan, 600 F. Supp. at 1058. But see Chemical Waste Management v. Arm-
strong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("the 'unclean hands'
doctrine espoused in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., has no place in CERCLA
actions.").
52. Mardan, 600 F. Supp. at 1056.
53. Id. at 1058.
54. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(A)(1982 & Supp. V 1987) provides that any person
liable under subsection (a) shall be directly liable to the United States Government or a
State for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by those parties. See also Bulk
Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
("Although private parties may recover costs under section 9607(a)(4)(B), the fact re-
mains that much of CERCLA's language deals with government-sponsored clean-up
efforts.").
55. 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
56. Id. at 291.
57. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)
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who participates in the financial management of a facility. 8 The court
in United States v. Mirabile,59 however, rejected a broad interpretation
of "participation in . . . management" suggested by creditors. The
court distinguished between participation in financial decisions and
participation in operational, production or waste disposal activities.'
As such, the court concluded that actual control over the "nuts-and-
bolts" of the site operations was a prerequisite to imposition of
liability.61
Recent CERCLA amendments62 also recognize the hardship that
the Act's liability provisions may impose upon innocent purchasers of
real property.63  Congress incorporated a third-party defense provi-
sion" into the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(bank that held mortgage for property and later purchased it at foreclosure sale was
liable for cleanup costs). For a discussion of banks' and other creditors' liability under
CERCLA, see Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes
on Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133 (1986).
58. CERCLA section 101(20)(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a) provides:
Owner or operator means.. .(iii) in the case of any abandoned facility, any person
who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immedi-
ately prior to such abandonment. Such term does not include a person, who, with-
out participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility...
Id.
59. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
60. Id. at 20,995-97.
61. Id. at 20,996. The court noted that Congress contemplated this distinction
when it enacted CERCLA. "In the case of a facility, an 'operator' is defined to be a
person who is carrying out operational functions for the owner. . ." Id. at 20,995-96
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6182.) In a related opinion, the Mirabile court dis-
cussed the liability of the landowners who inherited, but did not cause, the hazardous
waste problem. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). The court held that because the vendees did not add to the
waste, but, on the contrary, exercised due care and took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of others, they could invoke the third party defense to liability. Id.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i)(1982 & Supp. V 1987).
63. See, eg., 131 CONG. REc. HI1,158 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1985) (comments of Rep.
Frank) ("nothing is more damaging to a good regulatory scheme than [sic] having any-
thing in it that could inadvertently sweep out within its coils innocent individuals"); 131
CONG. REC. S12,008 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985) (comments of Sen. Domenici) (the use of
an "extraordinary legal standard" for CERCLA liability unfairly burdens those who
clean up the hazardous waste.).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(f)(35)(1982 & Supp. 1987):
The third-party defense excuses a potentially responsible party from liability for
the acts or omissions of third parties .... when that party has exercised due care
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(SARA) of 1986.65 This defense to liability under CERCLA permits
vendees of real estate to qualify for the statutory defense 66 if they ac-
quire property without knowledge or reason to know67 of any contami-
and taken reasonable precautions if the property was acquired after the hazardous
substance was placed on, in, or at the facility and the landowner....did not know
and had no reason to know that a hazardous substance .... was disposed of at the
facility.
Id. Congress amended the definition of "contractual relationship," for the purposes of
section 9607(b)(3), to make clear that innocent purchasers of land may rely on the
"third-party" defense despite the fact that they engaged in a land transaction with the
previous owner who caused a release.
65. SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 and scattered sections of U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). For a general
discussion of the amendments, see Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under
the 1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365 (1987).
66. CERCLA section 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) states: There shall be no liabil-
ity.. .for a person otherwise liable who can establish.. .that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by:
(3) an act or omission of a third party... if the defendant establishes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned. . .and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could forseeably re-
sult from such acts or omissions.
Id. See also, H.R. RnP. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 187 (1986). In reference to
the landowner liability provision, the legislative history states that:
The duty to inquire under this provision shall be judged as of the time of acquisi-
tion. Defendants shall be held to a higher standard as public awareness of the
hazards associated with hazardous substance releases has grown, as reflected by
this Act, the 1980 Act and other Federal and State statutes. Moreover, good com-
mercial or customary practice... shall mean that a reasonable inquiry must have
been made in all circumstances, in light of best business and land transfer princi-
ples. Those engaged in commercial transactions should, however, be held to a
higher standard than those who are engaged in private residential transactions.
Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) states that in order to establish that the purchaser had
no reason to know of environmental contamination at the property the purchaser must
inquire into the previous ownership and uses of the property in an effort to minimize
liability. The scope of that inquiry is subject to a test of consistency with "good com-
mercial or customary practice," defined to include the following factors:
(1) any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant; (2) the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated;
(3) commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property;
(4) the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the prop-
erty; and (5) the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
Id.
For a discussion of the impact of the amendments, see Berz and Spracker, The Im-
pact of Superfund On Real Estate Transactions, 2 PROB. AND PROP. 49(5) (March-April
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nation. To establish the defense, the vendee must make an inspection,
which is implicit in caveat emptor,68 or risk a finding of negligence.
69
The purchaser must make a good faith inquiry into the previous own-
ership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice at the time of acquisition in order to minimize lia-
bility.70 In deciding whether innocent purchasers have met the test,
courts weigh equitable factors and hold parties involved in commercial
transactions to a higher standard than those engaged in private residen-
tial transactions.7" Congress recognized that the latter group of ven-
dees would probably pay a price unreflective of potential future liability
and would generally not be in the best economic position to assume
liability for cleanup costs.72
The Third Circuit squarely addressed this issue in Philadelphia Elec-
tric Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,73 a state law action, and held that caveat
emptor is a defense to liability for cleanup costs pursuant to the Penn-
sylvania Clean Streams Law.74 The court reasoned that in an arm's-
length transaction where both parties possess equal means of knowl-
edge about the land, caveat emptor operates to hold the seller liable
only for express provisions in the contract.75 In Hercules the vendee
inspected the land, inquired into its past use, and learned of hazardous
waste on the property before purchasing.76 When evaluating the yen-
1988) ("The major effect of this new amendment.. .is not to provide limited relief to
innocent landowners. Rather, it places substantial investigatory and remedial obliga-
tions on purchasers and sellers of property.").
68. See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 90 n.1 ("The duty of inspection implicit in caveat
emptor has not been ignored in CERCLA.").
69. For a discussion of the innocent landowner provision of the 1986 CERCLA
amendments, see Levitas and Hughes, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real Estate Transac-
tions, 38 MERCER L. REV. 581, 597-600 (1987) ("recent changes in CERCLA may
operate to impose a standard of negligence on some landowners."). Id. at 597.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(f)(35)(B).
71. See supra notes 66-67 for a discussion of liability under the SARA amendments.
See generally, Bleicher and Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and
Related Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 Evntl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10017
(emergence of new statutory and common law governing liability for toxic waste pollu-
tion has greatly magnified the scope of potential liability).
72. See generally Note, Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser, 38 U. FLA.
L. REv. 253 (1986).
73. 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
74. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
75. Hercules 762 F.2d at 312.
76. Id. at 304, 314. The plaintiff claimed that the vendor's predecessor in interest
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dee's purchase practices, the court found it inconceivable that the
purchase price did not reflect potential environmental liability.77
Therefore, the court concluded that negating the market's allocation of
risks would place unbargained for liability upon vendors who may have
originally sold the property at a discount to remote vendors.78
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex 79 presented the court
with a unique opportunity to apply caveat emptor in the context of a
federal statute. For the first time, the court examined the scope of
CERCLA's liability and defense provisions in a situation where neither
the vendor nor the vendee were the original parties to the transac-
tion. ° The majority found that neither the statute nor its legislative
history supported the district court's finding that caveat emptor is a
permissible defense to corporate successor liability for cleanup costs."1
In reaching its conclusion, the court conceded that the defenses enu-
merated in § 107(b)8 2 are "not exclusive" 3 and "coexist with equitable
considerations."84 Nevertheless, the court concluded that because ca-
had caused contamination of ground water and river water during the vendor's opera-
tion of a chemical plant on the property. Id.
77. Id
78. Id.
79. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
80. See supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text (discussing the parties' relation-
ships to the original vendor and vendee and corporate successor liability).
81. 851 F.2d at 87. The district court relied upon the Third Circuit's approval of
caveat emptor as a defense to corporate successor liability in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985). Smith
Land, 851 F.2d at 88. Hercules is distinguishable from Smith Land only on the ground
that it involved a state law claim rather than a federal one.
The court did, however, state that courts may consider caveat emptor in mitigation of
contribution costs. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 89. The court stated that CERCLA pro-
vides explicitly that federal law governs contribution claims, and that the court based its
decision in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc. on Pennsylvania state law while sit-
ting in diversity. Consequently, the court held that it could not transfer its holding in
that case to a CERCLA claim "as a matter of course." Id.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1982 & Supp. V 1987).
83. 851 F.2d at 89.
84. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 80 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2862). The court also concluded that
caveat emptor, though not a defense to a government suit for cleanup costs, "arguably
would not contradict the statutory text." Id See also, 126 CONG. REc. S. 14964 as
explained by Sen. Randolph, a major sponsor of the bill:
The liability regime in this substitute [which became CERCLA] contains some
changes in language from that in the bill reported by the committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works. The changes were made in recognition of the difficulty in
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veat emptor completely bars recovery by a purchaser regardless of
other equities between the parties, its adoption would frustrate Con-
gress' desire to encourage cleanup by the responsible parties.85
The court's decision to extend CERCLA liability to corporate suc-
cessors86 in the vendor-vendee context while denying them the defense
of caveat emptor is misguided, inequitable, and based on an inadequate
reading of the evidence. When the court expanded CERCLA to in-
lude corporate successor liability, 87 it should not have limited defend-
ants' affirmative defenses to those specified in CERCLA.8 8 Instead,
defendants should be entitled to all the defenses available to corporate
successors with respect to liability inherited from predecessors. As the
district court recognized, one such defense is caveat emptor.89
The court acknowledged that Congress implicitly incorporated ca-
veat emptor into the innocent landowner defense in the 1986 SARA
amendments. 9' Under SARA, a vendee can only claim innocence from
liability for cleanup costs if the vendee thoroughly inspects the prop-
erty and finds no evidence of hazardous waste.91 Acting through its
predecessor, Smith Land found evidence of hazardous waste. The
prescribing statutory liability standards which will be applicable in individual
cases.
Id.
85. 851 F.2d at 89. The court also argued that caveat emptor contradicts the statu-
tory text because CERCLA authorizes the government to seek reimbursement costs
from any of the potentially responsible parties and leaves them to share the expenses
equitably. Thus, the court reasoned that caveat emptor would force Congress to choose
one defendant from among several and would cause "ill will between the government
and the unlucky party." Id. at 90.
86. See supra note 13 for a discussion of the corporate successor liability issue.
87. See supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text (discussing the parties' relation-
ships to the original vendor and discussing the corporate successor liability issue).
88. See supra notes 9,41 and accompanying text (description of CERCLA's defense
scheme).
89. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing the district court's
holding).
90. 851 F.2d at 90 n.l. The court states:
The duty of inspection implicit in caveat emptor has not been ignored in CER-
CLA... The Act relieves a landowner from initial liability on proof that after 'all
appropriate inquiry consistent with good commercial or customary practice' the
owner had no reason to know of the presence of a hazardous substance, quoting 42
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(f)(35)(B). See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text for
relevant discussion.
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purchase price reflected that potential liability.92 If the court had as-
sessed Smith Land's experience in real estate transactions93 in light of
SARA's inspection requirement, the court would have recognized that
defendants were entitled to invoke the caveat emptor defense.94 As a
result of the court's holding, vendors stand to be doubly liable.
CERCLA's legislative history indicates that Congress expressly de-
leted proximate cause and liability standards because they wished to
leave these issues to the courts to decide in an equitable manner.95 As-
suming that a vendor discounts his purchase price to reflect a vendee's
potential liability for cleanup costs, an equitable solution exists. Such a
solution would dictate that the courts give effect to the market's alloca-
tion of risks and resources when deciding liability. If the courts allow
knowledgeable purchasers to avoid liability, such purchasers will reap
a windfall equal to the difference between the purchase price of the
land and its fair market value after cleanup. 96 Courts construing CER-
CLA's liability provisions should recognize that many of its provisions
address government-sponsored actions and, as such, do not fully con-
template private cost recovery actions or the appropriate defenses.97 If
the courts continue to expand CERCLA's liability sections without
also providing for the appropriate equitable defenses, CERCLA liabil-
ity will continue to be a hidden trap for all but the most wary.
Kathleen D. Lindenberger*
92. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing Smith Land as an
experienced purchaser).
94. 851 F.2d at 87 (3d Cir. 1988).
95. See supra notes 20, 68 and 88 for a discussion of equitable issues.
96. See supra note 72.
97. See generally Note, Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser, 38 U. FLA.
L. RaV. 253, 280 (1986) ("If allowed to avoid liability, knowledgeable purchasers may
reap a windfall equal to the difference between the purchase price of the land and its fair
market value when cleansed of toxic wastes.").
* J.D. 1990, Washington University.
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